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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), and was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is Salt Lake City Corporation entitled to ignore its own mandatory ordinances regarding
public hearing notices? That is, did the trial court err in holding that Salt Lake City Corporation
may send out materially misleading hearing notices in violation its own mandatory ordinances, and
that this violation does not give rise to any actionable claim on the part of citizens such as
appellant Steven McCowin who was thus deprived of adequate hearing notice? The trial court
dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss, based upon standing and due process arguments; the
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness without deference to the trial court. Utah County v.
Ivie. 137 P.2d 797 (Utah 2006); D.A.R. v. State of Utatu 133 P.3d 445 (Utah App. 2006); Cook
v. Zions First National Bank. 57 P.3d 1084 (Utah 2002). This issue was presented to the district
court and preserved for appeal. (R. at 2-4,410-15)
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES
The following portions of the Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake City are relevant to the
determination of this appeal: Salt Lake City Ordinance 21 A.04.020.E provides in relevant part
that, "The word 'shall' is mandatory; the word 'may' is permissive." Salt Lake City Ordinance
21 A.10.020 provides in relevant part that,
Providing all of the information necessary for notice of all public hearings
required under this title shall be the responsibility of the applicant... The
historic landmark commission shall hold at least one public hearing to review,
1

consider and approve, approve with conditions, or deny an application for a
certificate of appropriateness for alteration, new construction or demolition of a
landmark site or contributing structure(s) located in the H historic preservation
overlay district.... Where a public hearing is required, such hearing shall be
held after the following public notification:... Notice byfirstclass mail shall be
provided a minimum of fourteen (14) calendar days in advance of the public
hearing . . . to all owners of the land... within eightyfivefeet (85*) for
certificates of appropriateness for alterations and three hundred feet (300*) for
certificates of appropriateness for new construction.... The notice for mailing
for any public hearing required pursuant to subsections A through E of this
section shall state the substance of the application and the date, time and place of
the public hearing, and the place where such application may be inspected by the
public. The notice shall also advise that interested parties may appear at the
public hearing and be heard with respect to the application.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 27, 2006, plaintiff and appellant Steven E. McCowin ("Mr. McCowin")filedhis
Complaint against defendants and appellees Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City"), Barry
Rasmussen and Mark Hammond ("Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond") claiming that these
defendants had violated mandatory City ordinances in the manner in which the City issued its
authorization for Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond to construct a large, two-story building
catty-corner from Mr. McCowin5 s home in the University Historic District. (R. at 1-14) In
particular, Mr. McCowin claimed that the City and Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond had sent
out a deceptive hearing notice, and that the two-story building is architecturally non-compatible
with the University Historic District. (R. at 3-4)
On August 21, 2006, the Cityfileda Motion to Dismiss (R. at 61-7), seeking dismissal of
Mr. McCowin's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On August 8, 2006, Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammondfiledan Answer to the Complaint.
(R. at 15-24) Subsequently, on September 29, 2006, Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammondfileda

2

Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (R. at 359-382), seeking dismissal of
the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and/or Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court dismissed Mr. McCowin's Complaint on November 14, 2006. (R. at
584-86)
Mr. McCowinfiledhis Notice of Appeal on December 6, 2006. (R. at 587-88)
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

This case involves the City's approval for the construction of a large, two-story

accessory building in the University Historic District. (R. at 1)
2.

In September or October of 2005, the City issued a written notice of a public

hearing to be held on November 2, 2005 (the "November 2 hearing"). The hearing notice stated
that the following matter would be considered at the November hearing:
Case No. 0270-05 at 446 South Douglas Street by Barry Rasmussen and Mark
Hammond, requesting to construct a new garage with access to the abutting
alley. This property is located in the University Historic District.
(Rat 2, 6)
3.

Mr. McCowin alleged that the two-story building proposed by Messrs.

Rasmussen and Hammond is substantially more than a "garage" as that term is defined in the
City's Ordinances, and that the hearing notice was therefore deceptive. (R. at 2-3)
4.

Mr. McCowin alleged that this deception prevented himfromknowing the

substance of the proposal that would be discussed at the November 2 hearing, and interfered with
his right to appear at the hearing and oppose the proposed two-story building. (R. at 3-4).
5.

Mr. McCowin presented evidence to the district court that the City violated other

of its mandatory ordinances in the manner in which it conducted the November 2 hearing. (R. at
3

418-420)
6.

As soon as Mr. McCowin had actual notice of the substance of the two-story

building, he promptly initiated this law suit. (R. at 4)
7.

Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond refused to allow any discovery regarding the

non-"garage" nature of their two-story building. (R. at 395)
8.

In its Memorandum Decision dated October 30, 2006, the district court noted that

it "has serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the 'notice' provided Plaintiff in this case. (R.
at 551)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The City's mandatory Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 gave Mr. McCowin the right to receive a
non-deceptive notice of the November 2 hearing.
Neither of the two cases upon which the district court based its dismissal dealt with the
violation of a mandatory notice ordinance; neither case supports the district court's judgment that
Mr. McCowin had no right to a non-deceptive hearing notice notwithstanding Ordinance
21 A. 10.020.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. McCOWIN HAS ALLEGED A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT OF
NOTICE UNDER THE CITY'S MANDATORY NOTICE ORDINANCE

The City's Ordinance 21A.10.020 mandates that "[pjroviding all of the information
necessary for notice o f the November 2 hearing regarding the proposed two-story building "shall
be the responsibility of the applicant" - that is, it was the responsibility of Messrs. Rasmussen and
Hammond. The ordinance further requires that the hearing notice
4

shall be provided . . . to all owners of the l a n d . . . within eighty five feet (85 f ).
. . for alterations and three hundred feet (300f) . . . for new construction.... The
notice for mailing . , . shall state the substance of the application.
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 is not discretionary; its notice requirements are imposed with a mandatory
"shall."1 In Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25,1fi[29-30, 979 P.2d 332, the
Utah Supreme Court held that a city "is not entitled to disregard its mandatory ordinances," and
that "the substantial compliance doctrine" does not apply to "expressly mandatory" ordinances.
Mr. McCowin alleged in his Complaint that the City and Messrs. Rasmussen and
Hammond violated Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 by failing to disclose the "substance" of the proposed
two-story building, and instead sending out a materially deceptive hearing notice. (R. at 2-4)2
This deceptive notice violated not only Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, but also the fundamental purpose
of a hearing notice - to " adequately inform[] the parties of the specific issues they must prepare
to meet." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Gibbs. 500
P.2d 209, 215 (Idaho 1972)).3 There is authority from other jurisdictions supporting an argument
that the City's failure to "comply with the statutory notice requirement deprived it of jurisdiction

1

See Salt Lake City Ordinance 21A.04.020.E: "The word 'shall' is mandatory; the word
'may' is permissive."
2

The hearing notice stated that only a "garage" was proposed. (R. at 6) Mr. McCowin
alleged that the two-story building proposed by Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond was in fact
substantially more than a "garage" as that term is defined by Ordinance 21 A.62.040. (R. at 2-4)
Mr. McCowin also presented evidence that Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond had refused to
allow discovery regarding the non-"garage" character of their building. (R. at 395)
3

See also Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal v. Idaho Power Co., 574 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho
1978) ("Notice is rightfully considered to be a critical aspect of due process to be afforded in any
administrative process
Appurtenant to the right to notice is the right to be fairly notified as to
the issues to be considered."); Drum v. Fresno County Dept. Public Works, 192 Cal. Rptr. 782,
786 (App. 1983) ("Wholly inaccurate notice is no notice at all.").
5

and rendered invalid its decision to" approve the two-story building. Walkingstick v. Bd. of
Adjustment of Tulsa. 706 P.2d 899, 903 (Okl. 1985).4
The trial court noted that the evidence raised "serious concerns regarding the adequacy
of the 'notice' provided" in this case (R. at 550-51), but never decided whether, as a matter of
fact, the notice was sufficiently deceptive to violate Ordinance 21A.10.020. Instead, the court
held that "prior to reaching this issue, the Court must determine that [Mr. McCowin] had a
protectable property right for purposes of constitutional due process." (R. at 551) The court then
held that because the City had some degree of discretion in whether to approve the two-story
building, Mr. McCowin had no protectable property interest in the outcome of the November 2
hearing, and therefore no right to receive a non-deceptive notice of that hearing. (R. at 551-52)
The trial court erred by ignoring Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, which granted a right of notice
to all adjacent property owners regardless of whether their "protectable property right[s]" were at
stake in the hearing. It is true, of course, that if the November 2 hearing involved a taking of
propertyfromMr. McCowin, then even without Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 he would have had a
constitutional due process right to a non-deceptive hearing notice.5 However, as this Court held
4

See also 8A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §25.261, at 388-89
(3 ed. 2003) ("Indeed, notice complying with statutory and ordinance requirements may be
jurisdictional, so that a hearing and decision by a zoning board without timely and proper notice
are void and of no effect."); 4 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 22.17,
at 48049 (4th ed. 1996) ("The requirement that board action be preceded by notice and hearing is
jurisdictional
The requirement of notice is satisfied only if the notice affords to parties and
other interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare as well as to attend.... Where notice
to certain property owners is required by law, failure to give timely notice to such owners
invalidates the action of the board.").
rd

s

Hansenv.Evre, 2005 UT 29, f 10,116 P.2d 290 ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. In order for this guarantee to be
6

in West Valley City v. Roberts. 1999 UT App 358, | 8 , 993 P.2d 252,
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee due
process of law in governmental actions in which life, liberty, or property may be
at risk. However, we need not reach this constitutional level of analysis here
because procedural due process is guaranteed to the appellants by the
[municipality's] City Code.
Unlike the constitutional rights under the due process clause, the right to a hearing notice
mandated by Ordinance 21 A.10.020 did not depend upon the existence of any protectable
property right. Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. McCowin "had a protectable property right
for purposes of constitutional due process" (R. at 551), the trial court erred in holding that as a
matter of law Ordinance 21 A.10.020 did not give Mr. McCowin any right to a non-deceptive
hearing notice.6

implicated, however, a petitioner must raise a claim to some viable liberty or property interest of
which he is being deprived."); Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983) ("To satisfy
an essential requisite of procedural due process, a 'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice
which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet.") quoting
State v.Gibbs. 500 P.2d 209 (Idaho 1972).
^ h e trial court's holding is also inconsistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court
in Morris v. Public Service Commission. 321 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1958), that "it is axiomatic
that the order of an administrative body issued without notice to affected individuals is violative of
due process." See also Travlor Bros., Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah
App. 1987) ("orders of administrative agencies issued without notice to affected individuals
violate due process"). These holdings suggest that under Utah law the due process right to notice
of an administrative hearing does not depend upon the existence of a "property" interest, but is
extended to any "affected" person.
The trial court also ignored the substantial legal constraints on the City's discretion to
approve the two-story building. Ordinance 21 A.34.020H.H. 1 mandates that the City "shall" only
approve buildings that meet certain explicit criteria of architectural compatibility within the
University Historic District. Mr. McCowin alleged that the two-story building violated this
architectural compatibility constraint. (R. at 3) Mr. McCowin submits that he had more than a
'"unilateral expectation," Patterson v. American Fork City. 2003 UT 7 f23, 67 P.3d 466, that the
City would comply with these mandatory ordinances.
For purposes of this appeal, however, there does not presently seem to be a need to
address either of these issues. All that is required is the enforcement of the mandatory terms of
7

II.

THE CASE LAW RELIED ON BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
INAPPOSITE

On page 5 of its Memorandum Decision (R. at 551), the district court cited Patterson v.
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,67 P.3d 466, a case in which real estate developers claimed that
a city's unfavorable zoning decision had deprived them of "substantive due process." The Utah
Supreme Court held that,
To state a cognizable substantive due process claim, [plaintifls] mustfirstallege
sufficient facts to show a property or liberty interest warranting due process
protection.
2003 UT 7, f23, quoting Crider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs. 246 R3d 1285,1289 (10th Cir.
2001). The Patterson court held that the developers' "unilateral expectation" of a favorable
zoning decision was not a property interest protected by substantive due process. 2003 UT 7,
ffiI24^27.
Because Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 creates a right to a non-deceptive hearing notice
independently of constitutional due process, Patterson is inapposite. As discussed above,
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 mandated notice to adjacent property owners whether or not they had a
constitutionally protected property interest at stake in the hearing.
On pages 5 and 6 of its Memorandum Decision (R. at 551-52) the district court quoted
from Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994), a case in which homeowners
claimed that a municipality failed to give them notice of a zoning proceeding regarding an
adjacent industrial facility, and that this lack of notice amounted to a denial of procedural due
process. At first blush, Gagliardi seems on point. However, in Gagliardi there is no mention of a

Ordinance 21A.10.020.
8

municipal notice ordinance- The homeowners in Gagliardi apparently attempted to imply a right
of noticefromconstitutional due process principles - arguing that they had a property interest in
the municipality's enforcement of its zoning code against the adjacent industrial facility, that this
property interest merited due process protection, and that due process required a hearing notice.
18 F.3d at 193. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that the landowner had no property interest in the enforcement of the zoning
code, and
Since the [homeowners] lack a property interest in the enforcement of the
[municipality's] zoning laws, they are unable to state an actionable claim for
deprivation of procedural due process.
18 F.3d at 193. As argued above, Mr. McCowin need not leverage a right to notice from
constitutional due process principles; he asks only that the mandatory notice requirement of
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 be enforced. Gagliardi is therefore inapposite.7
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, appellant Steven McCowin respectfully asks that the
judgment of the district court be reversed, and that this matter be remanded so that the parties can
complete discovery regarding disputed matters of fact.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007.

Iteven E. McCowin, pro se

7

Moreover, the plaintiffs in Gagliardi were bound by New York law, and did not have the
benefit of the axiom of Utah law recognized in Morris, 321 P.2d at 646, "that the order of an
administrative body issued without notice to affected individuals is violative of due process."
9
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN MCCOWIN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 060912420

vs .
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION;
BARRY RASMUSSEN; MARK HAMMOND,

October 25, 2006

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Salt Lake City Corporations' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, and
Plaintiff's Motion to Advance and Consolidate Trial on Merits
with Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

The Court

heard oral argument with respect to the motions on October 23,
2006.

Following the hearing, the matters were taken under

advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, and
where applicable, the exhibits attached thereto, hereby enters
the following ruling.
This matter comes before the Court the result of the
building of a two story structure located at 44 6 South Douglas
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
With its motion, Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City")
argues Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because it is

MCCOWIN v. SALT LAKE CITY

MEMORANDUM DECISION

untimely, coming more than 3 0 days after the meeting or action
for which the notice was given.

See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-209.

Moreover, contends the City, Plaintiff in this case did not file
any appeal with the City Land Use Appeals Board and as such, has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Finally, asserts

the City, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed as he has
admits receiving notice of a proposal to construct a garage on
the neighboring property and has failed to demonstrate any
deficiency in that notice.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the City had an
obligation to provide notice of the "substance" of the building
and in this case, the hearing notice falsely represented that the
proposed building was a "garage."

According to Plaintiff, he

relied upon the City's representation what only a "garage" was
proposed when, in fact, it was a two-story building that would be
the final product.

Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, it was because of

this representation that he did not attend the hearing.

As a

matter of law, contends Plaintiff, the hearing notice's use of
the word "garage" failed to give adequate notice of the substance
of the proposed building.
In light of the facts of this case, it is Plaintiff's
position an exception to the requirement that administrative
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MCCOWIN v. SALT LAKE CITY

remedies be exhausted should be instituted and the equitable
discovery rule should be enforced to toll the limitations period.
Defendants Barry Rasmussen and Mark Hammond join in the
arguments posed by the City with respect to dismissal of this
matter.

Specifically, argue Defendants, Plaintiff has no

protectable property interest, the notice was adequate, and the
Commission complied with City ordinances.
Alternatively, Defendants contend summary judgment is
appropriate as Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations (which provide that any person adversely
affected by a final land use decision has thirty days within
which to file a petition for review in district court or such
petition is barred).

See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-(2) &(6)).

Moreover, argue Defendants, regardless of whether the Commission
violated any ordinance, the undisputed record demonstrates the
Commission's decision would have been the same, hence, Plaintiff
has suffered no prejudice.

Finally, assert Defendants, Plaintiff

is not entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law
because he cannot establish special damages.

Indeed, argue

Defendants, any damages suffered by Plaintiff are shared by every
landowner who lives in the University Historic District.
Plaintiff in opposition argues Defendants' motion for
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summary judgment is premature.

Moreover, contends Plaintiff,

the two-story building's incompatibility with and injury to the
University Historic District is, at the very least, a disputed
issue.

Additionally, asserts Plaintiff, he was entitled to a

hearing notice accurately disclosing the substance of Defendants'
proposed building.

Indeed, argues Plaintiff, the City's

ordinances mandate such a notice and this mandate was violated by
the misleading notice that was sent.

Further, contends

Plaintiff, Defendants have repeatedly initiated and threatened to
initiate, legal proceedings against conditions they dislike on
their neighbors' property.
It is Plaintiff's position Defendants' two-story building is
not a garage, the Notice was legally deficient and, the City
violated a number of its ordinances.
Further, argues Plaintiff, as argued above, the equitable
discovery rule tolls the limitations period.
Finally, Plaintiff contends he has suffered special damages
over and above those suffered by the District generally.

Indeed,

argues Plaintiff, because of the proximity of the building to his
property, it intrudes into his light and air in a way not shared
by the general public.
After reviewing the record in this matter and although the
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Court has some serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the
"notice" provided Plaintiff in this case, prior to reaching this
issue, the Court must determine that Plaintiff had a protectable
property right for purposes of constitutional due process.
For his part, Plaintiff asserts the City's ordinances and/or
the public hearing requirement create such a right and give him
something in the nature of a property interest.

This said,

however, a legitimate claim of entitlement requires explicit
rules creating the right and, if a city has discretion in
applying the rules, there is no legitimate.claim of entitlement.
See

Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 473 (Utah

2003) .

Indeed, in Gagliardi

v. Village

of

Pawling,

18 F.3d 188

(2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit elaborated stating:
Where a local regulator has discretion with
regard to the benefit at issue, there
normally is no entitlement to that benefit.
An entitlement to a benefit arises "only when
the discretion of the issuing agency is so
narrowly circumscribed" as to virtually
assure conferral of the benefit. The issue
of whether an individual has such a property
interest is a question of law "since the
entitlement analysis focuses on the degree of
official discretion and not on the
probability of its favorable exercise."
Id.

at 192. (Internal citations omitted).
While Plaintiff has cited several ordinances, he has pointed

to nothing in those ordinances which purports to limit the City's
Page 5
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discretion in approving new structures in the University Historic
District.

Furthermore, the "deprivation of a procedural right to

be heard . . .
at stake."

Id,

is not actionable when there is no protected right
at 193.

Based upon the forgoing, the Court finds Plaintiff's
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Accordingly, the same is dismissed.

In light of this

xuling, the Court denes not reach Plaintiffs Motion to Advance
and Consolidate Trial on Merits with Hearing on Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.
DATED this

day of October, 2006.
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